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This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol-Oates 
efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-a-vis green 
defaults in the face of price inertia and deliberate defaulting by subpopula- 
tions. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control 
approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy 
schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of 
abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any 
single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost 
rule is developed to optimise the green defaults and traditional policies of 
standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.
Keywords: (JEL: H21, H23, L51, Q52, Q58).
1 Introduction
Behavioural economists have observed a great number of seemingly irrational human be- 
haviours, including inertia to price incentives and a stickiness of ‘defaults’ caused by 
indifference or a naive belief in experts and authorities. These behavioural traits are 
often observed in subpopulations such as elderly people or youngsters, but are also ev­
ident in comparisons of small and large firms. This gives rise to the profound problem 
of behavioural heterogeneity in economic policy. The notion that individuals, firms and 
corporations respond differently to economic stimuli and default rules has obvious con- 
sequences for the effectiveness and optimality of regulation. The long-standing debate 
about ‘Quantities versus Prices’ (Weitzman [25]) is just one of the candidates potentially 
affected by this; others are theories of enforcement (Malik [10]) and rules of liability and 
contract law (Jolls et al. [8 ]).
A more recent approach within behavioural economics is nudging (Thaler and Sunstein
[23]). A nudge, according to Thaler and Sunstein, is “any aspect of the choice architecture 
that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.” In their classic “cafeteria example” a
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cafeteria owner arranges the food she has on offer in such a way that healthy foods are 
displayed at the front to stimulate customers to buy and eat more healthfully. Other 
famous examples of nudges are smaller plates in canteens to reduce calory intake, or 
technical and contractual defaults such as double page printer settings and pre-defined 
retirement plans (from opt-in to opt-out). By definition, a nudge does not change the set 
of choices, and so any attentive and otherwise unbounded, rational economic agent will 
not be affected by it.
Nudges have recently been applied in various policy contexts. In the US, President Obama 
selected Cass Sunstein as head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to 
“clarify the role of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory policy” following his 
2009 memorandum on regulatory review (The White House [24]). In a parallel move, 
David Cameron created the Behavioral Insights Team (BIT) “to help organisations in the 
UK and overseas to apply behavioural insights in support of social purpose goals” (www. 
behaviouralinsights.co.uk/) .  Similar efforts are underway in the EU, France and the 
Netherlands (Piniewski et al. [16], Oullier and Sauneron [13], Council of the Environment 
and Infrastructure [4]) and are being undertaken by international organizations such as 
the OECD (OECD [14]).
The use of nudges by social planners is assumed to improve people’s welfare; as such, 
it can be viewed as a form of paternalism. Indeed it has been coined “libertarian pa- 
ternalism” (Sunstein and Thaler [22]) or, in the language of behavioural heterogeneity, 
“asymmetric paternalism”, as it will only affect subgroups with certain flaws in their ra­
tional decision-making (Camerer et al. [2]; Hausman and Welch [6 ], 126). Thaler and 
Sunstein recommend that the regulator should influence consumers’ choices in a way that 
make consumers better off, “as judged by themselves” (Thaler and Sunstein [23], 5). But, 
as Croson and Treich [3] emphasize, this “implicitly assumes that the regulator is rational 
and benevolent” , whereas there is ample evidence to the contrary in the literature, namely, 
of biased regulation . Nudging, in this critical view, “systematically put[s] the reader in 
the mind of the regulator” (Sugden [21]).
Another ethical issue relates to the potentially manipulative nature of nudges. Hansen 
and Jespersen [5] differentiate between a non-transparent manipulation of choice and 
behaviour by means of nudges and a transparent facilitation of behaviour (“empower- 
ment nudges”). While this juxtaposition is stylized (and more work should be done on 
clarifying the categories), there seems to be a consensus in the literature that techni­
cal ‘green defaults’ (e.g. preset double-sided print options) are non-manipulative and 
ethically defensible within the terms of “Rawls’ Publicity Principle” (Thaler and Sun­
stein [23]). These rather complex ethical issues do not arise in this paper because we 
refer to the well-established Baumol-Oates approach of politically defined standards and 
efficiency-enhancing prices (Baumol and Oates [1]), while our concern is non-manipulative 
‘green defaults’ .
This paper deals with the effects of behavioural heterogeneity on environmental policy. 
Departing from the traditional taxes-versus-quotas debate in environmental economics, 
we demonstrate that direct regulation by means of command-and-control can outperform 
price-based policies under certain circumstances, and that the design of environmental 
subsidies and taxes as policy instruments needs to reflect behavioural heterogeneity. More­
over, we make the economic case for using green defaults as a choice-preserving policy 
mix of regulatory standards and price-based incentives, which lead to superior results 
compared to any single-instrument policy in populations that display behavioural hetero- 
geneity.
2
2 The model
We consider emitting firms of K different technolgies. These technologies are ordered with 
respect to abatement costs Ck(a),k  =  1, 2, K  where a is abatement. The technolgies 
exhibit the following properties
Ci(a) <  C2(a) <  ■ ■ ■ <  CK (a), Va >  0 (1)
C (a) <  C2(a) <  ■■■ <  CK (a), Va >  0 
Ck (0) =  Ck(0) =  0
To keep the analysis simple we assume a quadratic abatement cost function 
b
Ck (a) =  2  a2, k =  {1, 2, ■■■ , K }, bi <  b2 <  ■■■ <  Ьк (2 )
which satisfies ( 1).
Finally, we assume that there are Nk,k =  {1, 2, ■■■ , K }  emitters within each technology 
class. Hence, the total sum of emitters amounts to
N =  E  Nk (3)
k=1
Environmental policy enters into the model by utilizing the price-standard approach in- 
troduced by Baumol and Oates [1]. The public authority introduces an emission reduction 
requirement. We start from unrestricted emissions { e rmax, eVmax, ■ ■ ■ , e rmax}  where emax are 
emissions from technology k unrestriced by policy measures. We could also imagine that 
these amounts refer to historic emissions from a base year.
The authority fixes a minimum total reduction obligation for all emitting firms such that 
к Nk k
Е Е  aik >  /E  =  / Y. Nk e r -  0 < / < i (4)
k=1 i=1 k=1
The efficient allocation of abatement across emitters can be achieved by minimizing total 
abatement costs, i.e.
K Nk
J 2 J 2 Ck (aik) (5)
k=1 i=1
subject to (4).
From the first order conditions we know that
C'k(atk ) =  >, i =  { 1 , 2 , ■■■ ,Nk } ,k  =  {1, 2, ■■■ , K }  (6 )
where > is the Lagrangean.
Since the abatement cost functions are the same within each technology class we have
aik =  ak, i =  {1, 2 , ■■■ ,Nk } ,k  =  {1, 2 , ■■■ , K }  (7)
The optimal allocation of abatement effort a* =  {a1, at,, ■ ■ ■ , a*K}  equates marginal abate­
ment costs to each other.
From the literature it is well known that a single emission price achieves an efficient 
allocation of both emissions and abatement levels.
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Each emitter of technology class k minimizes her abatmement costs while taking into 
account the costs of paying for her residual emissions.
min[Cfc(ak) — r (ak — 5еГ*)] ^  C'k(ak) =  r, k =  {1, 2 , ••• , K }  (8 )ak
where r  is a tax rate and 5 =  {0, 1}. If 5 =  0 the environmental authority apply a 
tax-based approach. If 5 = 1  the policy maker adopts subsidies to encourage abatement 
efforts. We could also conceive r  as the equilibrium price on a certificate market where 
5 =  0 refers to an auction approach and 5 =  / could be described as grandfathering 
approach. Notice, that we have omitted index i because each emitting firm in class k 
choose the same abatement level ak.
Since each emitter sets her marginal abatement costs equal to the tax rate an efficient 
allocation of emissions is achieved (see (6 )). The environmental target is achieved by 
choosing the tax such that the reduction goal (4) is satisfied. Hence, r * is chosen such 
that
£  Nkak: =  /E  (9)
k=1
where ak solves (8 ). Alternatively, a command and control approach could be applied. In 
this case an overall uniform lower limit of abatement levels A  is introduced such that the 
environmental objective is achieved. To do so, the limit per emitter is set such that
A =  K/E  (10)
EK=i Nk
Needless to say, this policy is inefficient if marginal abatement cost functions differ.
2.1 The performance of traditional policy instruments under be­
havioural heterogeneity
In the following we analyse how the policy instruments reviewed in the previous section 
affect the allocation of abatement levels when emitters do not always behave rationally 
across the population, i.e. when they choose their abatement levels so as to minimize 
their costs. Let us assume that emitting firms behave either rationally with probaibility y 
or exhibit passive behaviour with probability (1  — y ) by negelecting any optimizing efforts 
(inertia). We assume that these probabilities are independent of technology type k. 
Passive behaviour implies that firms do not respond to price incentives such as taxes 
or subsidies. They only comply with measures imposed in the context of an command 
and control approach. If the policy maker relies only on a price oriented policy (taxes, 
subsidies, etc.), she will have to take this heterogeneous behaviour into account. The same 
applies to the determination of a single overall abatement level for firms. In addition, the 
policy has to take account the stochastic nature of abatement behaviour, which requires 
the caclulation of expected values.
To begin with, let us assume that the policy maker relies exclusively on a tax approach. In 
this case the environmental authority needs to calculate expected abatement levels. Take 
e.g. technology class k consisting of Nk emitters. It is a standard tenet of probability 
theory1 that the probability of one out of two events occuring i times (i : 0 <  i <  NK) is 
distributed according to the binomial distribution function
Nk!
(Nk — i)!i!
- Y i(1 — Y)(Nk-i) (11 )
LSee e.g. Mood, Graybill and Boes [12]
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Here, the one event is that emitters behave rationally. The complementary event is that 
emitters behave passively. Accordingly, this probability applies to Nk — i firms behaving 
passively.
To calculate the expected aggregate abatement level under behavioural heterogeneity we 
first have to determine the expected abatement level of each technology class. If a firm 
behaves rationally it will choose abatement according to (8 ), thus leading to a level aTk. 
Hence, expected aggregate emissions of class k will be2
Nk (  N ! \
g  { (N„ — i)!i ! Y ( 1  — a  =  Y N ka  (12)
The same procedure is applied to passively behaving firms that melely simply comply 
with a abatement prescription A  0. The probability of this behaviour is 1 — y. Hence, 
the expected abatement level of technology class k is
Nk (  N ! \
X  у (Nk —j ) ! j ! (1 — Y)jn{Nk" 3)jJ A =  (1 — n)N kA  (13)
The aggregated expected abatement level of all k technology classes follows directly by 
adding (12) and (13) across all classes:
K K
n J ^ N k a Tk +  (1 — y ) J^N kA  (14)
k=1 k=1
It is a straightforward matter to calculate the aggregate expected abatement costs in a 
similar way:
K
A A C  =  Y .
k=1
Nk N  !
g  ( (N k - i i) iü  Y‘ ( 1 — Y)(Nk " 4 \ Ck
T)!jT (1 — * ) ’  Y Nk" f,j c k  (A)
=0  V ( k — i
+  fl (——  
j=o \ (Nk — j )!j
:15)
K K
Y Nk Ck (aTk ) +  (1 — y)  X /  Nk Ck (A)
k=1 k=1
In the following we analyse the performance of three traditional policy instruments under 
the behavioural heterogeneity introduced above.
1. Tax policy
Under a tax regime, rational emitters behave according to (8 ), leading to abatement 
levels a'k. Notice, that 5 =  0. Since the policy maker relies solely on an emissions 
tax there are no constraints on quantity, hence A  =  0. Thus the tax rate r  =  f  
has to be fixed such that the expected aggregate abatement level complies with the 
environmental target (see (4)).Thus we have
K
Y X) Nkak =  /E
k=1
:16)
2This derivation follows the usual proof in the Standard literature. See e.g. Mood, Graybill and Boes
[12], 89.
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2 . Abatement subsidies
Again, the policy maker introduces a price incentive to subsidize abatement. In this 
case, (8 ) is valid for 5 = 1 .  The subsidy rate has to be chosen such that (16) is met.
3. Direct abatement regulation
In this case, the regulatory authority does not rely on prices. Instead, it fixes an 
abatement standard A >  0 with which each emitting firm has to comply. Thus, all 
firms will abate according to this provision irrespective of their behavioural type. 
The standard A =  A  must be set such that the environmental target is achieved,
i.e.
K
A E  Nk =  /E  (17)
i=1
From the traditional model we know that a price setting policy always guarantees that 
the environmental target will be achieved in an efficient way, provided the emission price 
level is set properly. In contrast to this, introducing a mandatory abatement level is inef- 
ficient as it leads to higher aggregated abatement costs than in the case of a tax/subsidy­
approach. At this point it is interesting to analyse whether this assessment applies also 
in a world where emitters display heterogeneous behaviour.
Result 1
• In the case of behavioral heterogeneity the tax/subsidy rate must be higher than in 
the case of a pure price-standard approach, i.e.T >  r *.
• A price oriented policy is not always better than a quantity-setting regulation. The 
relative perform,ance depends on technological properties, the distribution of technol­
ogy classes and the proportion of rational firms.
Proof:
The first part follows directly by comparing (9) with (16). The second part will be shown by 
example in section 2.3 below.
Obviously, if a certain proportion of firms is price resistant, a tax policy can only achieve 
the abatement target if the tax rate is higher than in the classical price standard approach 
case. This inertia calls for the use of an additional instrument, namely, the green defaults 
introduced in the following section.
2.2 Green defaults as optimal policy mix
We have assumed that a certain proportion of emitters do not actively choose their emis­
sion levels by minimizing their abatement costs. One remedy against this inertia could 
be a command and control-style quantity regulation which forces emitters to a achieve 
certain level of abatement irrespective of their abatement costs. The other more flexible 
option is to introduce green defaults. In our model a green default is a requirement of 
a fixed abatement level with which each emitter has to comply. However, in contrast to 
the traditional quantity constraint of a command and control policy, here emitters are 
allowed to deviate from the prescribed level if they wish to do so. The decision to deviate 
leads to additional costs (benefits) in terms of tax payments (subsidies). If the active
6
emitter increases her abatement level beyond the default value she receives subsidies; if 
she reduces her abatement efforts she is required to pay tax. This mechanism resemble 
the ‘flexibility regulations’ of the early U.S. Clean Air Act ( ‘bubble’ and ‘offsets’) but can 
also be seen in any standard-based rule, for example a speed limit, which gives rise to 
monetary sanctions, fines or liability, if the choice of speeding-and-paying can be modeled 
as a deliberate economic decision of the agent3.
To capture this mechanism in the model we rewrite (8 ) as follows:
min[Cfc (пк) -  т ( n k -  A)] (18)ak
As before, т is a tax rate to be fixed and A  is the default value. The rational emitter of 
technology class k minimizes total abatement costs leading to
Ck (nk ) =  т, ^  nk, k =  {1, 2, ••• , K }  (19)
In contrast to rational firms passive emitters will stick to the green default A. Having 
thus described the behaviour of all emitting firms we can now proceed to the task the 
policy maker has to solve.
As in the traditional policy setting the task consists in choosing the policy that minimizes 
aggregate abatement costs. Since emission behaviour is random the relevant object func­
tion is expected aggregate abatement costs derived in (15). In contrast to the traditional 
setting, the policy maker does not choose between a price or a quantity approach but 
instead seeks to utilize both instruments. Thus, green nudging can be modelled as the 
application of a policy mix approach consisting of prices (taxes/subsidies) and quantities 
(green defaults).
Minimizing aggregate expected abatement costs (15) subject to the environmental con- 
straint
K K
nJ^Nknk +  (1 -  y ) J^N kA  /E  (2 0 )
k=i k=i
leads to the following first order conditions4
к Вп'
ж 52  Nk(Ck(n'k) -  A ) =  0 (21)
k=i - т 
(1  -  Y) E  Nk (Ck(A) -  A) =  0 (22)
k=1
dar
where A is the Lagrangean. Bearing in mind that -d'k >  0 and utilizing (19) we can 
transform (2 2 ) to
^  C 'k(Ä) =  т (23)
EK=i Nk
3In the more general terms of nudging it would be any behavioral Standard which preserves the choice 
of disobedience (over-obedience) with the consequence of additional psychological or situational economic 
costs (benefits) such as the ‘costs’ of changing TV settings from energy-saving to time-saving stand-by 
modes or the ‘benefits’ of having healthy foods within arms reach.
4These conditions are also suffcient to characterize the optimal policy due to the assumed properties 
of the abatement cost functions.
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The green default should be set such that the average marginal abatement costs of all 
emitters is equated to the tax rate, which is in turn equal to the marginal abatement 
costs of rational firms. We call this optimality condition the average marginal abatement 
cost rule (AM AC). This rule is easily explained if one multiplies the nominator and the 
denominator by (1 — y ) exhibiting the ratio as the average marginal abatement costs 
of passive firms5. Since passive emitters do not exploit efficiency gains by equating their 
marginal abatement costs to the tax rate the policy maker should set the green default such 
that these firms’ average marginal abatement costs are equal to the marginal abatement 
costs of each rational firm.
Together with the environmental constraint (2 0 ) the AM AC can be used to determine the 
optimal policy mix { r o, Ao}  whose properties are summarized in the following proposition.
Result 2
1. Optimality of policy mix: It is optimal to introduce a green default, i.e. a pure 
price policy approach is suboptimal. An exclusively quantity approach is likewise 
suboptimal. In formal terms:
0 < A o <  ----------Е -------  (24)
(1  — y ) Е Й 1 Nk
2. The tax rate of the policy mix approach is higher than the tax rate of the price 
standard approach. Formally:
T >  r o >  r * (25)
Hence, under a green default approach every rational emitter will invest more in 
abatement than in the price standard approach case.
Proof: See appendix.
The first assertion simply states that both instruments should be utilized. Price responsive 
firms react to the tax rate and passive emitters follow the green default. Since aggregated 
abatement costs are to be minimized both instruments are deployed such that the marginal 
abatement costs of both behavioural groups are equated, as stated by the average marginal 
abatement cost rule (36). Figure 1 illustrate this finding. The AMAC-rule is satisfied at 
the point { A o, r o}. From figure 1 one also can easily see that T >  r o In the pure tax 
approach the tax rate T is chosen such that the abatement target /E  is achieved (point 
pT). The tax rate must be set rather high to meet this target. Aggregated abatement 
costs can be reduced by lifting the abatement level of passive emitters and thereby making 
it possible to reduce the tax rate.
The first part of the proposition and the tax relation T >  r o is easily to understand. This 
does not extend to the relation between r o and r * which follows from the AMAC-rule and 
the convexity of the abatement cost curve. The proof contained in the appendix shows 
that under the green default the sum of abatement levels of rational firms is always higher 
than the sum of regulated abatements of the passive emitters, i.e.
E  Nk<  >  E  NkAo (26)
k=1 k=1
5The equivalence of total average marginal abatement costs with the average marginal costs of passive 
firms comes from the independence of n from the technology classes.
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Inserting this relation into (20) immediately yields the result, that the tax rate r o would 
lead to higher total abatement efforts than required in the textbook case, i.e.
£  Nk4 °  > /E. (27)
k=1
It is interesting to observe that the presence of passive emitters (y  <  1) requires a higher 
tax rate on emissions than in the classical price standard approach despite the introduction 
of a green default that secures the abatement by passive emitters.
Corollary 1
• The strictness of environmental policy decreases (increases) with the fraction of 
rational (passive) emitters. In formal terms:
dro 1 dAo
<  0 and <  0 (28)
OY OY
• Aggregated abatement costs decrease as the proportion of price responsive firms in­
creases, i.e.
OAAC
- ö y -  < 0  (29)
This corollary re-emphasizes the findings of result 2 by following the optimal policy tra- 
jectory with respect to the fraction of rational firms. Starting from the textbook case 
y  =  1, it becomes clear that environmental policy must be strengthened. Both, the tax 
rate and the green default must be increased as y  decreases in order to guarantee the 
environmental target /E . The larger the fraction of passive emitters the higher the green 
standard and, at the same time, the higher the tax rate.
The fraction of passive emitters can be seen as a measure of the rigidity of markets. 
More rigid markets demand stronger regulatory interventions. In the case of pure taxes, 
regulators need to consider that some passive parties can not be moved by taxes. They 
will have to adopt higher taxes for rationally acting emitters to achieve the overall desired 
level of abatement.
The impact on aggregate abatement costs (see (15)) is also rather obvious. The larger the 
fraction of rational firms minimizing their abatement costs the lower aggregate abatement 
costs are.
2.3 Example: two technology classes
The results obtained can be exemplified for the case of two technolgies b1 <  b2 and 
N 1 =  N2 emitters within each technology class. Utilizing the abatement cost function (2) 
we can derive from (19) the optimal abatement efforts of rational emitters
aTk =  7—, k = 1 ,  2 (30)
bk
Inserting (30) into (20) establishes the default value A  as a function of r  such that 
the emissions standard /E  is met. In the following figure6 the emissions restriction is 
represented by the blue line.
6Figure 1 is plotted for the example: b\ =  0.01, b2 =  0.04, n =  0.5, and yE =  8000.
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AFigure 1: Optimal Policy
Similarly we can draw iso-abatement-costs curves by utilizing (15). Iso-abatement cost 
curves can be obtained by inserting (30) into (15) for a predefined cost level C C . The red 
curve gives the iso-abatement cost curve for the cost level which relates to the optimal 
solution characterized by (23) and (20). Iso-abatement curves to the south west (north 
east) represent lower (higher) costs. The optimal policy mix { t o, Ao}  is located where the 
slopes of both curves are equated. Figure 1 also enables us to demonstrate the findings of 
Result 1. A pure tax policy approach (point pT 7) leads to a tax ratethat is higher than 
the optimal tax rate. Vice versa, the abatement provision given by the pure command 
and control approach (point CaC8) is higher than the green default Ao. Needless to say, 
points (pT) and (CaC) lead to higher aggregate abatement costs than under the optimal 
policy mix.
Whether pT or CaC leads to higher aggregate abatement costs (see result 1) has yet to 
be evaluated. In the following Figure we have drawn total abatement costs for the pure 
tax case (hatched surface) and for the command-and-control approach (plain surface). 
The hatched surface is obtained by inserting the pure tax policy approach into the sum 
of both abatement cost functions. From (16) we obtain
T T r 1 1 1
n 1 +  n2 =  [ Г  +  1~]т =  /E/y bi b2
7At point pT we have т = T.
8At point CaC we have A =  A.
(31)
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which can be solved for r. Inserting r  into the quadratic abatement cost function yields 
the total9
мам ) +  ад и =  « а  (32)
Notice, that the aggregated abatement costs depend on technologies (bi) and on the pro­
portion of rational emitters. The surface is drawn as a function of bi and b2. Similarly, 
total abatement costs under a command and control approach can also be derived. Uti- 
lizing the abatement cost functions and (17) we get
Ci(A) +  C2(Ä) =  ( b i+ -b2). t E l  (3 3 )
Again, total costs are a function of bi and b2.
Figure 2 : A pure policy comparison
The figure10 clearly shows that the success of both pure policies depends on the structure of 
technologies. If technologies are very diverse, i.e. if the absolute amount of the difference 
of bi — b2 is large, then the pure tax policy approach fares better than the command 
-and-control-approach, and vice versa. This result is easily understood. In the pure tax 
case the tax rate must be rather high due to the fact that only a fraction of all emitters 
will respond. Hence, to fulfill the standard /E  the policy must be fairly strict, leading 
to relatively high aggregate abatement costs due to the convexity of cost curves (Note, 
that passive firms do not abate in the pure tax case). By contrast, an overall standard
9Abatement costs for passive emitters are nil, since A = 0. They simple pay the full tax burden on 
their unreduced emissions baseline (emax). Notice, that in these partial equilibrium models it is assumed 
that tax receipts are returned to the emitting industry sector on a lump-sum basis.
10To keep numerical values low, we have rescaled the vertical axes by dividing aggregate abatement 
costs of both policies by (yE)2.
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applied to all emitters can be relatively weak since all firms have to fulfill the provision 
A. However, this command and control approach is rather inefficient in the case of 
heterogeneous marginal abatement cost curves. Thus, there are two countervailing forces 
that affect total abatement costs under the two regulatory regimes. On the one hand, the 
pure tax approach is highly efficient but covers only the proportion of rational emitters. 
On the other hand, we have the command and control approach covering all emitters but 
being inefficient. The more technologies differ the greater this inefficiency is.
This can be seen by the area in the b1 — b2 plane where aggregate abatement costs under 
a pure tax policy are higher than under the command and control approach decreases if 
the fraction of rational firms increases. If we equate (32) and (33) and solve for, say, b2 
we get the two solutions
U -  (2  +  Y  +  2 V (1 — Y  j , j , _  (2  +  Y  — 2 V (1  — Y  j , (34)
b21 =  -------------------------------b1 b22 =  ------------------------------- b1 (34)Y Y
Both solutions are the mathematical expresion of the cut lines of the hatched with the 
plain surface. If we derive (34) with respect to y  we can observe that the slope of the 
left (right) solution for b2 decrases (increases). If the fraction of rational firms increases 
(decreases) the set of b1 — b2-combinations where total abatement costs under a pure tax 
policy are higher than under a command and contral approach contracts (broadens). The 
implication is quite obvious. The more rational emitters there are the more appropriate 
is a price-oriented policy approach and vice versa: the more passive firms exist the more 
a command and control approach is appropriate.
3 Summary and outlook
This paper has demonstrated that the existence of subpopulations with price resistant 
behaviour and deliberate defaulting has important implications for the design of envi­
ronmental policy. Uniform command and control approaches can outperform price-based 
instruments, and pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted to achieve the politically 
desired level of total emissions. As a choice-preserving policy mix green defaults are su­
perior to any single-instrument policy in the case of behavioural heterogeneity. Much 
remains to be done. There are many examples of the effectiveness of nudges in envi­
ronmental policies, for example in policies to improve energy efficiency and the choice of 
green energy (Shogren et al.[17] and [18]). However, most of the literature is concerned 
with individual and household environmental behaviour. Few studies have looked at orga- 
nizational nudges despite pervasive evidence of managerial inattention and organizational 
routines (Sims [20]; Wiederholt [26]; Henderson and Kaplan [7]). Both of these could help 
reveal important factors that contribute to price inertia and deliberate defaulting in firms. 
Additionally, the interplay of consumer inertia and dynamic pricing (Zhao et al. [9]) has 
not been sufficiently considered in the nudging literature. Time-variant pricing of energy 
usage, for example, would increase the difference in profits from behavioural inertia com- 
pared to rational choice and consequently reduce the probability of deliberate defaulting 
within a population, as we demonstrate in this paper. The more general question arising 
from these analyses is how the fraction y  of behavioural inertia within a population could 
be reduced by means of tailored policy efforts. While environmental awareness raising and 
education could clearly contribute to a lower y  and thus to greater regulatory efficiency 
according to our findings, they would also involve additional costs of implementation etc. 
Consideration of these additional instrument costs and benefits as well as the remaining
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behavioural inertia may lead to even more policy mixing. Green defaults combined with 
any such instrument may prove superior to both traditional single-instrument policies 
(such as quotas and taxes) and stand-alone nudges. Finally we would expect important 
insights to be gained from applying our theory of optimal nudging to different special 
cases. For example, empirical findings show that the default inclusion of natural hazards 
in general homeowners insurance makes a considerable difference in the uptake of natural 
hazards insurance compared to a rule of separation of both lines (Schwarze and Wagner
[17]). Based on our theory of optimal defaults we would expect that ‘insurance nudging’ 
is economically superior to mandatory insurance (with no choice-preserving mechanism) 
or direct regulation of private risk mitigation. Another promising area of study, following 
the recent findings of Parry et al.[15], would be to compare emissions standards (which 
allow a trade-off between activity level and technology choice) and technology fixes such 
as fuel efficiency standards for cars.
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of result 2
To prove the first statement assume, per absurdum, that A° =  0. From (23) it follows that 
тo =  0 and, hence, by (19) that a°k =  0, Ук. But this contradicts the environmental constraint
(20). Next assume, per absurdum, that
yE
(1 -  пУЁЪ  1 Nk
AO =  - — (35)
From the environmental constraint (20) it follows that TO =  0 so as to reduce the abatement 
levels to zero, i.e. a°k =  0. But from (23) it follows that TO >  0 which is a contradiction.
To prove the second statement we utilize the assumed quadratic form of the abatement cost 
function (see (2 ). Utilizing (19) AMAC can be rewritten as:
EK=K Nt k A =  T =  b3 a'o, y j  =  {1, 2 , . . .  , K } (36)
l^k=1 Nk
Multiplying both sides by Nj and summing up leads to
£  Njbj(AO -  a j ) = 0 (37)
k=1
From (37) we can infer that there must be a i € {1, 2, . . .  , K } such that a '-1 > A, a'° < AO and 
a'+1 < AO. (37) can be rewritten as
i-1 K
bi(A° — a'  ) =  — 5 3  Nkbk(A° — ak ) — 5 3  Nkbk(A° — ak ) (38) 
k=1 k=i+1
Adding to both sides bj, Y^ K= i Nk(AO — a'k°) leads to
K i-1 K
bi Nk(A° — ak ) =  5 3  Nk(bi — bk)(A° — ak ) +  5 3  Nk(bi — bk)(A° — ak ) (39) 
k=1 k=1 k=i+1
From the assumed properties of the abatement costs function and from (8 ) we know, that
b1 < b2 <  . . .  < bK (40)
a\> a2>  . . .  > a'K
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E  Nk(Ao — ak° ) < 0 ^  £  Nkak° >  £  NkAo (41)
k=1 k=1 k=1
Define the difference
к K
e =  E  Nk al 0 — E  Nk Ao > 0 (42)
k=1 k=1
Then it follows from (20)
к к
E Nkak° =  YE  +  (1 — n)e ^  Y , Nkak > Y e  (43)
k=1 k=1
Since ak is a positive monotone function with respect to т a comparison of (9) with (43) shows 
immediately that to > т* .
4.1.1 Proof of corollary 1
Differentiating (23) and (20) with respect to п leads to
Taking these properties into account it follows from (39), that
(  — EK=1 Nk EK=1 Nk Ck (A) \ (  \ =  (  0 
 ^ п EK=1 N ka'f (1 — п) EK=1 Nk ) { ^ °  )  ^k k a f k \ — E  k=1 Nkak
From (44) it is easy to calculate
дтo (E  K=1 Nk ak  ) (E  K=1 Nk Ck (A))
(44)
дп |E|
and
dAo =  (EK=1 Nk )(eK=1 Ni ck  (a ))
дп |E|
< 0 (45)
< 0 (46)
where the determinant of the system matrix is |E| < 0.
The second part of the corollary can be proved by recalling (15)
K K
AAC =  п E  Nk Ck (ak ) +  (1 — п) E  Nk Ck (A) (47)
k=1 k=1
Utilizing the envelope theorem the derivative of AAC with respect to п is
dAAC K K
=  E  Nk Ck (ak) — E  Nk Ck (A) < 0 (48)
дп k=1 k=1
The sign follows from the AMAC-rule (36) and the cost minimizing behaviour of rational firms 
(see (19)).
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